China occupies a unique position among developing countries. Its success in achieving relative stability in the financial sector since the institution of reforms in 1979 has given way to relative instability since the beginning of the current global financial crisis. Over the last few years, China has been on a path of capital account opening that has drawn larger inflows of capital from abroad, both foreign-direct and portfolio investment. Of late, a surge in these inflows has introduced problems for the monetary authorities in continuing with an autonomous monetary policy in China, especially with large additions to official reserves, the latter in a bid to avoid further appreciation of the country's domestic currency. Like other developing countries, China today faces the "impossible trilemma" of managing the exchange rate with near-complete capital mobility and an autonomous monetary policy. Facing problems in devising and sustaining this policy, China has been using expansionary fiscal policy to tackle the impact of shrinking export demand. The recent drive on the part of Chinese authorities to boost real demand in the countryside and to revamp the domestic market shows a promise far different from that of the financial rescue packages in many advanced nations.
China occupies an unique position among growing countries in the developing region for at least four reasons: These include: (a) its large volume of exports and trade surplus, the latter at around 10% of its GDP, the huge official reserves at $2.58 trillion by end of February 2010 (with $2.28 trillion invested in securities, large portions in US Treasury bonds); 1 (b) the growing trade, as well as investment links with Asia (especially with Hong Kong, the self-governing territory of the Peoples' Republic of Mainland China); (c) the country is a major importer, especially of intermediate goods from neighboring countries in Asia; and (d) China's success in achieving reasonable stability in the financial sector since the beginning of reforms in 1979 and also of late, during the recent global financial crisis. The latter, however, had given way to signs of potential instability, especially since the onset of the global crisis in the autumn of 2008. This has been with efforts on the part of the monetary authorities to cope with free capital flows while maintaining national autonomy in monetary policy and management of exchange rates-a situation described in the literature as an "impossible trilemma" (Glick and Hutchison 2008) .
The close integration of China with the world economy over the last two decades has raised concerns from different quarters which relate both to (a) the possible effects of the recent global downturn on China and (b) the second-round effects of a downturn in China for the rest of world. If affected adversely by the crisis, the Chinese downturn will directly impact nations that are its major trading partners. A majority of these supply-chain countries are in developing Asia. We would like to examine both issues (a) and (b), as mentioned above, in this paper. employees now work for overseas companies inside China" (Gu 2009 ). This makes it important for China that FDI flows do not dry up.
Going by an opposite view offered in December 2008, "China…is in a very unique position in that it has $1.9 trillion in foreign currency reserves. China...can now…divert the focus away from an export-driven economy to one that begins to focus on domestic demand."
Moreover, "...while every other country is desperately trying to formulate a rescue plan fuelled with an increase in the national debt, China does not have this worry and this will form its primary advantage" (Huges 2008 ).
China over the last few years has been on a path of capital account opening which has drawn larger inflows of capital from abroad, both FDI and portfolio types. Of late, a surge in these inflows has introduced problems for the monetary authorities in continuing with an autonomous monetary policy in China, especially with large additions to official reserves, the latter in a bid to avoid further appreciation of the national domestic currency. Liberalization of capital flows has also changed its composition, with volatile flows of portfolio capital having a much larger share, an aspect which will be discussed later in this paper.
Summing up, China today seems to be closely integrated with the outside world, not only with its huge exports and FDI inflows, but also in terms of short-term capital flows. The first two contribute to output and employment, while generating foreign exchange, contributing substantially to the $2.58 trillion in official reserves of the country. As we will point out later, FDI has also been instrumental in providing a major share of exports and gross domestic capital formation, apart from providing employment. In China the regulatory institutions in the area of banking, securities, and insurance were given wide-ranging powers, keeping a close vigil on the functioning of both finance and industry. Banks, a few of which could float equities in the market, were also forbidden to enter as buyers of stocks, a practice that reminds us of the norms of segregated banking and the GlassSteagall Act of the United States. As we have pointed out elsewhere, universal banking-the much acclaimed practice of financial markets in the era of global finance-while creating opportunities for profitable speculation, can ignore the real sphere of the economy at the expense of production and employment (Sen 2003) . Pundits estimate that a 50% decline in the stock market might lop 1-1.5% off China's doubledigit percentage GDP-growth rate." Of late, China's economy, like other emerging markets, is facing a renewed surge of portfolio capital inflows, with a large part directed by speculation. As we have pointed out above, a large part of this is related to the United States of having a near-zero rate of interest and the related downslide in the dollar rate. With the surge in these capital inflows causing upward pressure on the RMB rate and the domestic interest rate failing to provide an "uncovered parity"
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in terms of the two exchange rates, it was natural that expectations of a RMB appreciation surfaced in the market, providing an impetus to currency speculation.
Analyzing further, China, like some other developing countries, today faces the "impossible trilemma" (Krugman 1999 ) of managing the exchange rate with near complete capital mobility and national autonomy in their monetary policy. However, while China is able to sustain the current spread between its prime lending rate at around 5.36% in the face of the US rate at 0.25%, 10 it does not signify China's success in avoiding the hazards of a typical trilemma as arises with open capital flows, managed exchange rates, and an autonomous monetary policy. 11 China has been steadily sterilizing a significant part of the rising capital inflows by selling government bonds and with higher rates of cash reserves (see figure 12 ), which partly reduces the related expansion of high-powered money (reserve money) and money supply. However, selling government bonds is bound to face its own limits, especially in terms of the related fiscal burden of the rising interest costs. 12 These developments indubitably indicate the seriousness of the trilemma currently faced, as well as handled, by China-keeping its capital flows free and managing both monetary policy and the exchange rate in the interest of the national economy. 12 At the same time, a higher interest rate is what makes possible the sale of bonds by making those attractive to the public and simultaneously dampen the rate of inflation. But the higher rate may also encourage further inflows of capital, with interest rate differentials (from overseas) which add to currency speculation, betting against the managed exchange rate which is expected to appreciate. Finally the higher rates also go against the interests of the real economy.
However, this may also go with further changes in the composition of trade within Asia, with
Chinese manufactures displacing those from other Asian countries. The new pattern of Asian economic integration may also dampen the impact of further decelerations in the West on Asian economies, at least via the trade route, if not via capital flows. We also need to remind ourselves that growth in China is not just a case of a typical export-led process as happened in some other countries in Asia. It is an instance of a state-led industrialization, as in Japan earlier and more recently in Korea, along with the opening up of large domestic, as well as external, markets.
Also, industrialization in China has not remained confined to an export enclave, especially with its vast territory and the swarming population providing the base for economic expansion from within. As pointed out by a recent study, much of the domestic activities (as well as exports) are generated by domestic demand (Pairault 2009 ). Of late, the second-generation FDI inflows from the EU, Japan, and the United States have been directed to a niche within the home market, unlike the first-generation flows that catered more to export markets (Ali and Guo 2005) .
We also need to recall the role of the "three legs" (exports, property market, and government spending) that are considered to support the Chinese economy; of these, government spending seems to be functioning better. One needs to focus on the changes in the rising value as well as the composition of such spending in China since the onset of the global economic crisis. As mentioned earlier, with problems faced in devising and sustaining autonomy in monetary policy, China has been using expansionary fiscal policy to tackle the impact of shrinking export demand. The recent drive the on part of Chinese authorities to boost real demand in the countryside and to revamp the domestic market shows a promise much different from the rescue packages for the financial sector in advanced nations. Of late, China has announced a four trillion RMB ($586 billion) package of fiscal expenditure, which represents about 16% of China's economic output last year and is roughly equal to the total of all central and local government spending in 2006. New spending of even half that amount would be next to China's six trillion RMB annual budget for this year. Strategies as above aim to bolster domestic demand and help avert a global recession by spending on housing, infrastructure, agriculture, healthcare, and social welfare, along with tax deductions for capital spending by companies. 13 Concerns, however, have been raised on the inadequacy of those 13 Comparing notes, the United States pushed through a $168 billion stimulus package earlier this year, equal to about 1% of gross domestic product, and the Federal Reserve has aggressively cut interest rates, complementing the Treasury's $700 billion for troubled financial institutions. Japan has a $51.5 billion package that largely consists of measures on employment and poverty in the countryside, one which may not be achieved much by the priorities in achieving infrastructural development! On the whole, it is possibly too early to identify the possible impact of this expansionary spending on China's economy. Data from China's National Bureau of Statistics project a year-on-year 11.9% output growth rate in the first quarter of 2010, while predictions by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) respectively put the 2010 GDP growth at 9.9% and 9.6% (Sin and Rabinovitch 2010) . However, questions are raised as to how the overall growth satisfies the needs of the economy, especially with what is described as a "jobless recovery" and with migrant workers continuing to face serious crisis.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Analysis of China's integration with the rest of world provided in the paper generates the following observations: China's trade integration has of late been more with Asia rather than with the advanced countries. Even the share of Hong Kong, which used to be treated as a corridor for China's trade with the industrialized countries, has diminished in recent years.
Given the pattern of growing instability in advanced economies, this may work out as a favorable factor for China in terms of withstanding the potential hazards of a sudden collapse of export markets in the advanced countries.
The pattern, however, is very different in regard to capital flows. China today is integrated closely with the financial markets of advanced economies, both with the long-term payouts to families and tax relief for businesses and Germany is moving on tax breaks and loans that will cost the government around $29.9 billion over four years. On balance, the new pattern of China's integration with the rest of world is thus beset with both positive and negative signals for the Chinese economy. Given that China's growth and stability have assumed a degree of importance for the rest of world that was never as significant as it has of late been, the future of the Chinese economy remains an important issue for the world as a whole.
